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Quality revolutions, solidarity networks, and sustainability 
innovations: following Fair Trade coffee from Nicaragua to 
California 
 
Christopher M. Bacon1 
Santa Clara University, USA 
 
This is the essence of a quality exchange—quality coffee for the buyers in exchange for a 
higher quality of life and environmental quality within producer communities.   
Merling Preza, General Manager of PRODECOOP, a cooperative of small-scale coffee 
farmers in northern Nicaragua.   
  
Like a potter who needs very fine clay for fine pottery, we need very fine coffee to survive 
against the huge corporations. 




 Thousands of coffee growing communities entered a deep crisis between 1999 and 2004, when green 
coffee prices plummeted from US$1.20/lb to US$ 0.45/lb (US$ 2.64/kilo to US$ 0.99/kilo) (Bacon 2005).  
Discounted for inflation, these were among the lowest coffee prices on record.  The effects in coffee-growing 
communities were immediate and severe.  The United Nations' World Food Program declared a food security 
emergency in Central America coffee-growing regions (WFP 2003).  Faced with dramatic economic losses, 
many Latin American farmers sacrificed the biodiversity associated with shade coffee when they switched to 
cattle ranching in search of better economic returns.  In Nicaragua, banks foreclosed on about 10% of the 
coffee farms, and school attendance rates declined as families pulled children out of school to help in the 
fields (CEPAL 2002).  Civil society development organizations, such as Oxfam International, ensured that 
the humanitarian crisis accompanying this coffee price crash received ample publicity, including a US 
Congressional Hearing in 2002, and multiple articles in mainstream newspapers.   
 The dominant response to the post 1999 coffee price crisis in Central America consisted of 
international and domestic government support for mitigation of economic losses and partial alleviation of 
humanitarian issues, without substantially altering existing agrarian power relations (Bacon et al. 2008a).  
This consisted of debt forgiveness for some of Central America's largest coffee farmers, increased food aid 
intended for rural workers (often channeled through the owners of these farms), and in some cases additional 
investment in rural infrastructure including roads and schools.  Research and policy often promoted solutions 
through diversifying production away from coffee, or increasing the quality of the coffee and accessing price 
premiums in the specialty coffee market. These responses could be identified with mainstream corporate 
social responsibility. The conventional political economic analysis largely focused on the persistent North-
South inequalities within the coffee value chain (Talbot 2004), suggesting the need for increased state-based 
cooperation including a new binding international coffee agreement. But this provided few short-term steps 
to resolve the collapse of the sector. 
 Nicaraguan smallholder cooperative leaders working in partnership with a Californian small-scale 
roasting company CEO pioneered an alternative approach.  They united to design and build coffee tasting 
laboratories among smallholder producer cooperatives, and then cooperative leaders used this opportunity to 
catalyze local organizing efforts and create a national smallholder cooperative association. This association 
soon gained a share of power in a domestic coffee industry historically dominated by colonial powers, and 
corporate and domestic elites.  These cooperatives also stood at the forefront of the burgeoning Fair Trade 
movement.   
 This article concerns a flagship project within this alternative approach to confront the coffee crisis.  
The protagonists are several leaders of smallholder Fair Trade coffee cooperatives in Northern Nicaragua, 
including Merling Preza, Fatima Ismeal and Pedro Hasslam; and Paul Katzeff, CEO of Mendocino, 
California's Thanksgiving Coffee Company, who served as the project director.  As a three-time president of 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
1 Dr. Christopher Bacon, Assistant Professor, Department of Environmental Studies and Sciences, Santa Clara 
University, CA 95050-4901, USA.  cbacon "at" scu.edu.  I acknowledge extensive editing by Colin Duncan, Ravi Rajan 
and Simon Batterbury as well as comments from several colleagues, especially at Nancy Peluso's Land Lab.  This is the 
third paper in Rajan S.R. and Duncan C.A.M. (eds.) "Ecologies of Hope", special section of the Journal of Political 
Ecology 20: 70-179. 
 
Bacon                                                                                                                          Fair Trade coffee networks 
Journal of Political Ecology                                     Vol.20, 2013                                                                   99 
the Specialty Coffee Association of America and longtime promoter of "high quality" artisan coffee, social 
justice and sustainability, Kazeff's life has much to teach us about the history, innovation and politics of 
coffee.  The coffee quality improvement project he proposed in the 1990s combined a structural analysis of 
the coffee value chain structure, and commitments to social activism, with the industry-based knowledge of 
coffee roasting craftsmanship and a leadership role in the specialty coffee industry. The idea was to build 
coffee tasting laboratories embedded within smallholder Fair Trade cooperatives.   
 In this article, I present three interconnected sustainability innovations within this system, and reveal 
the social, political and ecological histories that made them possible (Seyfang and Smith 2007).  Northern 
roasters, the importers, and a handful of inaccessible laboratories in coffee producing countries largely 
control the "secret" art of coffee tasting and quality identification. The first innovation was the diffusion of 
coffee quality control labs, essentially coffee tasting facilities and the associated quality control systems to 
sort beans by size and identify their physical defects. These were among the first labs that smallholder 
cooperatives constructed coffee growing regions. This innovation interconnected with a second one, when 
Nicaraguan smallholder cooperatives united to form a national association.  Thirdly, the Fair Trade system of 
certified producer associations, importers, roasters and retailers, is an innovation that crosses from North to 
South.   
If we take a step further back into the history embedded in Nicaragua's coffee landscapes and 
communities, we see the catalytic role of the 1979 Revolution and subsequent Sandinista agrarian reform in 
supporting cooperatives and inspiring the international solidarity networks that are intimately connected to 
short-term success of a coffee quality project, and the emergence of Fair Trade coffee in North America. 
These deeper histories reveal several of the important causal roots associated with three recent sustainability 
innovations. They also contribute to re-inserting their politics at a moment when some certification agencies 
have led a race into mainstream and shallow corporate social responsibility, which risks depoliticizing and re-
defining Fair Trade to meet their market-based goals.  
 The article starts out by comparing the mainstream and alternative approaches to the coffee crisis. 
Next, it delves into a case study of a coffee quality improvement project that linked a roaster with ten Fair 
Trade smallholder cooperatives in northern Nicaragua, reporting briefly on the results of field research 
conducted across coffee producers in the mid 2000s. The final section discusses resonances with other 
articles in this Section and emergent theoretical considerations.  
 
2. The coffee crisis: conventional vs. alternative responses 
 Although nominal prices paid to coffee producers have rebounded slightly since 2004, the impacts of 
the crash remain, compounded by pre-existing chronic poverty. In other words, even though prices have 
recovered, the coffee crisis for many producer communities continues (Renard 2010).  Figure 1 compares the 
real conventional market prices with the minimum price floor established for Fair Trade certified coffee. 
Using the USA Consumer Price index to discount the prices for inflation, it shows the importance of the Fair 
Trade floor when conventional prices plummet, and discloses the declining real value of the Fair Trade price. 
When discounted for inflation, real coffee prices have declined substantially, losing more than 66% of their 
value from 1980 to 2005 (Lines 2005: 181). The binding economic clauses of the International Commodity 
Agreements (ICA) lasted from 1962 to 1989 and controlled world coffee prices. The agreement was 
supported by the US, the major consumer, as a compromise to guarantee supply (Gilbert 2011: 15). The 
coffee ICA served to slow the rate at which the coffee commodity prices lost their real value (Talbot 2004; 
Gilbert 2011).  The ICA disintegrated due to a combination of changing geopolitics (i.e. the fall of the 
USSR), the triumph of a market-centric approach to trade and development, and to a lesser extent the 
accumulation of internal problems within the ICA system (e.g. larger corrupt bureaucracies, countries not 
following their import/export quotas, and inefficient capacity within domestic government agencies).  
The conventional price crisis overwhelmed vulnerable rural economies and threatened the biodiversity 
associated with traditional shade coffee production, as farmers searched for more viable land use activities.  
From 1999-2002, the total monetary value of Central American coffee exports declined from US$ 1,678 
billion to US$ 700 million (IADP et al. 2002).  These low prices also increased debt burdens and provoked 
bankruptcies among coffee exporters, millers and farmers in producing countries.   An estimated 10 – 20% of 
Nicaragua's coffee farmers lost their land during the crisis, and laborers lost over 4.5 million work days 







Bacon                                                                                                                          Fair Trade coffee networks 
Journal of Political Ecology                                     Vol.20, 2013                                                                   100 
 
 
Figure 1: Real Fair Trade vs. commercial coffee prices 1988-2010 (using 1988 US$/lb green 
arabica coffee as the base year). Source: Modified from Bacon 2010a. 
 
 
3. The Neoliberal responses to the crisis  
 The conventional Neoliberal response to the coffee crisis comprised the actions of governments, 
multi-lateral development banks and large-scale corporations.  In a document titled Managing the competitive 
transition of the coffee sector in Central America, the Inter American Development Bank, United States 
Agency for International Development, and the World Bank provided a private sector based roadmap for 
increasing coffee quality and marketing efforts (IADB et al. 2002). An important, though unstated, 
component of this strategy was to implement these projects nominally intended for smallholders while 
maintaining profits levels for the US based coffee industry and in ways that did not significantly change the 
dominant political economic structure of the Central American coffee sector.  The coffee production structure 
consists of strong transnational corporate control of exports and increasingly, coupled with changing family-
based oligarchies that are often control (sometimes with transnational capital investments) coffee exporters 
and own the largest coffee plantations (Paige 1997). This is partially evidenced by uneven land distribution. 
For example, in Guatemala less than 3% of the farms control more than 70% of the coffee land, and these 
patterns are closer to 50% elsewhere in Central America (CEPAL 2002).  
 This "conventional" strategy focused on improving coffee quality, efficiency, traceability, and 
marketing to the expanding North American specialty industry.  The international grant and loan funds were 
channeled primarily through transnational commodities trading companies and international NGOs, and in 
the end, the funds often supported larger-scale centralized physical infrastructure for coffee processing and 
export.  Although the US Congress committees that approved this funding specifically mentioned benefits for 
small and medium sized farms, significant portions of the aid money ultimately benefited large landholders 
and private exporters. When the donor agencies considered sustainable coffee certifications, they generally 
opted for those with lower ecological standards than organic coffee, and with social justice requirements less 
stringent than those used for Fair Trade certified products, since other certifications, such as Rainforest 
Alliance, were cheaper and posed fewer changes to industry practice.  These agencies were less involved in 
the conventional strategy's third component, which provided more than US$100 million as an economic 
bailout for the highly indebted large landholders and private export houses (Bacon 2006).   
 The conventional neoliberal solutions were consistent with previous structural adjustments such as the 
privatization of state run coffee agencies, and the roll-back of market regulation. These strategies included 
selling to the more lucrative specialty coffee market segment, purchasing risk management insurance to 
mitigate coffee price variability (insufficient for dealing with a dramatic price crash), internet connections so 
farmers could see coffee prices on the open market, and promoting coffee quality improvement programs to 
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increase their export to higher paying markets (World Bank 2005; IADB et al.  2002).  The "other" producers 
– those who ostensibly could not make the quality cut – were subject to the "creative destruction of the 
market" and were expected to diversify into other export-oriented cash crops (CATO 2003).   
 The coffee crisis initially challenged neoliberal approaches to international development, since it 
brought about the de-regulation of the coffee market (e.g. the fall of the ICAs), the privatization of domestic 
coffee support agencies, and consequently, the elimination of a rural social safety net (for health, housing and 
education).  Media coverage of the social and environmental consequences often laid some of the blame 
squarely upon the massive corporation, that dominated the coffee trade and roasting industry, including 
Nestlé and Phillip Morris.  Oxfam International led an effective campaign that simultaneously highlighted the 
humanitarian crisis and connected them with the structural causes related to declining real prices paid to 
producers and the "rigged rules and double standards" that powerful Northern countries and corporations 
imposed upon Southern producers (Watkins and Fowler 2002). Unfortunately, most of these debates were left 
unfinished after charitable foundations reduced their funding for commodity and development related policy 
work and Oxfam decided to substantially cut funding to its Fair Trade and coffee campaign around 2007.  
 
4. The emergence of alternatives  
 In the same way that alternative agri-food systems proliferated in response to the consequences of an 
industrial agrifood system (Allen 2004), the well-publicized dystopias unleashed by the coffee crisis provided 
fertile ground for expanding several alternative approaches.  The collective international answer to this coffee 
crisis included NGOs, forward thinking coffee companies, and selected coffee producer cooperatives 
spearheading efforts to create 'relationship coffees' and enter into sustainability certification programs within 
the expanding specialty coffee industry. This effort coincided with growing consumer awareness and demand 
for higher quality and more sustainable foods and beverages (Goodman 2000). In the coffee sector, the rise of 
specialty coffee, enterprising certification agencies, and sustainable food advocacy converged to spread 
several eco-labels including organic, bird-friendly, Rainforest Alliance and Fair Trade certified.  Among this 
rapidly expanding constellation of sustainable coffee partnerships, many development and social movement-
oriented civil society organizations have identified Fair Trade and organic coffee networks as two of the 
alternative approaches that have the most promising sustainability and development outcomes (Bacon et. al  
2008a; Raynolds et al.  2007; Jaffee 2007).  
 Fair Trade and organic practices emerged from social movements that saw themselves as functioning 
outside mainstream commodity markets (Brown 1993; Bacon et al. 2008a; Jaffee 2007). After the 
development of certification programs, both eco-labels rapidly expanded through their engagement with a set 
of progressive roasters and retailers within the specialty coffee industry, and more recently with a host of 
mainstream corporations.  According to the largest Fair Trade association;  
 
Fair Trade is a trading partnership, based on dialogue, transparency and respect, which seeks 
greater equity in international trade. It contributes to sustainable development. Fair Trade 
organizations (backed by consumers) are engaged actively in supporting producers, awareness 
raising and in campaigning for changes in the rules and practice of conventional international 
trade (Krier 2005).   
 
Although several certified Fair Trade products now include large landholders, the international Fair 
Trade coffee and cacao standards require trade with smallholder cooperatives (FLO 2007).  In practice, Fair 
Trade is an uneven and often contradictory combination of different relationships connecting producers to 
consumers through diverse enterprises oriented toward different visions of the relationship between economy 
and society (Polanyi 1944). These range from corporate social responsibility approaches that require minor 
changes and generally enable 'business as usual' - for existing firms in the industry, to those actively seeking 
to create a more democratic economy organized into cooperatives, and to the many hybrids the fall along this 
continuum (Bacon 2010a).  
 Instead of silencing the post 1999 coffee crisis debates - a position taken by conventional coffee 
industry - the Specialty Coffee Association of America (SCAA) hosted lively discussions. Several small-
scale coffee roasting companies united to create the SCAA in 1982.  They saw themselves as a radical break 
from the mainstream market and a place for progressive politics, craftsmanship and higher margins (Katzeff 
2001a). As of 2008, the SCAA's 2600+ members consisted primarily of small-scale roasting companies, but 
also include traders, and larger companies such as Starbucks, farmer organizations, and producer-country 
representatives. The SCAA sought to differentiate itself from the US$ 80 billion bulk conventional coffee 
market by promoting coffee quality and sustainability.  Despite the inherent subjectivity of taste, it is a fact 
that quality standards, including both the number of physical defects on the bean and especially the flavors in 
the cup, are the primary criteria that most roasters and importers use when deciding which coffees to buy and 
how much to pay.  The North American specialty coffee market grows annually by 5-10%, reaching an 
estimated retail value of US$ 11 billion by 2005 (Liu 2007).   
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5. The political ecology of alternative food networks  
 Instead of blaming the victims and suggesting coffee farmers submit themselves to the "creative 
destruction" of markets and look for another export crop, political ecologists elucidate issue of power within 
the value chain and highlight the structural and historical causes associated with local outcomes. As 
Goodman notes, "By wide consensus, the origins of the present crisis are to be found in the breakdown of the 
International Coffee agreement (ICA) in 1989, the ensuing relaxation of supply controls, and the cumulative 
weight of chronic over-production on 'green' coffee prices in world export markets" (Goodman 2008: 5).  
Pronounced structural shifts, including corporate consolidation, have occurred in the coffee value chain in 
favor of Northern roasters and retailers (Talbot 2004).  In the past 15 years, coffee producers' export earnings 
have fallen from US$ 10-12 billion to less than US$ 5.5 billion, whereas international coffee market revenues 
have risen from US$ 30 billion to over US$ 70 billion.  In short, the share of producing countries in the 
coffee value chain has fallen from 30% to less than eight percent (Ponte 2004; Talbot 2004).  On the other 
hand, it was this same International Coffee Agreement mediated by Southern states that failed to provide 
market access to the Mayan small-scale coffee farmers that led them and their allies to begin creating an 
alternative Fair Trade agro-food system (Vanderhoff 2009). 
The rise of the specialty coffee industry and certification led several scholars to ask "Who gains from 
product rents as the coffee market becomes more differentiated?" (Fitter and Kaplinsky 2001). As in the  
commodity chain literature (Bair 2009), a Global Value Chain (GVC) analysis considers the international 
structure of production, trade, and consumption of commodities as disaggregated into stages that are 
embedded in a network of activities controlled by firms (Daviron and Ponte 2005).  The term 'global coffee 
value chain' refers to the world-wide industry, whereas specific reference to the Nicaragua-USA coffee value 
chain or the 'Fair Trade value chain' refer to the smaller subset of place-specific relationships within this 
larger system.   
 What is quality and how does it create value? Daviron and Ponte propose three categories for 
understanding quality and its links to economic value: product quality (i.e. size, physical defects, color and 
taste), symbolic quality (trademarks, brands, and certifications) and in-person service quality (for example, 
the way the barista makes and serves your latte) (Daviron and Ponte 2005).  Together with an analysis of the 
uneven power dynamics in the value chain, these concepts are used to unpack the relationships connecting 
value added, standards and price. The findings show farmers connected to a Fair Trade and organic value 
chain that can add both product and symbolic qualities and receive higher prices, though not always a higher 
percentage of the final retail price (Daviron and Ponte 2005; Bacon, Mendez, Gliessman, Goodman, and Fox 
2008). Figure 2 compares the Fair Trade and conventional value chains, and illustrates the integration that 
occurred in Nicaragua when smallholder cooperatives built cupping labs and used Fair Trade market access 
to scale-up in the value chain.  
 Rural sociologists and political ecologists were the first agro-food analysts to study the rapid rise in 
"alternative" agro-food systems (Goodman and Watts 1997). Several initial studies were cautiously optimistic 
about these potentially "more sustainable" foods and beverages. For example, Whatmore and Thorne 
published an article in 1997 analyzing the diverse networks that moved Fair Trade coffee from small-scale 
producers in Peru to more conscious consumers in the UK (Whatmore and Throne 1997).  Marie-Christine 
Renard's pioneering book about the intersection of bottom up peasant organizing efforts in Mexico and the 
development of the Fair Trade coffee certification system showed cautious optimism about the effects of 
these trade relationships (1999).  In both Nicaragua and Mexico, our own findings have shown that although 
livelihood insecurities persist, households connected to a Fair Trade market were less vulnerable to the 
consequences of crashing coffee commodity prices (Bacon 2005a; Mendez et al. 2010). Tad Mutersbaugh 
also recognized the potential benefits of certification programs, but highlighted the contradictions through 
detailed ethnographic studies analyzing how the use of local farmers in organic coffee inspection systems and 
requirements can disrupt indigenous labor routines and complicate neighborly relationships within several 
communities in Oaxaca, Mexico (Mutersbaugh 2004).  
The alternative value chain is characterized by more interaction and communication among buyers, 
producers, cooperative managers, and farmers and could contribution to accelerating grassroots sustainability 
innovations (Seyfang and Smith 2007). Innovation has traditionally referred to the introduction of a new 
dimension of performance.  This "new" dimension can emerge from a product, a different form of social 
organization, or it can be embedded within systems of production, distribution, and consumption.  I am 
interested in innovations that could enable community level empowerment, equity and more sustainability 
livelihoods.  There is a vital role in highlighting systematic traps and shortcomings associated with the 
corporatization of proposed alternatives (Guthman 2007), uncovering histories of violence and displacement 
(Peluso and Watts 2001), and identifying avenues for policy change (Bebbington 2000).  If this research is 
connected to participatory research processes with and for communities and social movements, there is a 
strand of political ecology that can contribute to opening ecological imaginations and creating possibilities 
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  Figure 2:  The conventional and alternative coffee value chains in Nicaragua.    
 
6. Two revolutions, international solidarity, and innovations 
 In order to explore the political ecology of the conventional and alternative coffee value chain this 
case study follows the bean from Nicaragua's northern mountains to northern California's coastal cities. 
Beyond tracking the physical coffee bean from mountainside family farmers into the hands of Bay Area 
coffee drinkers, our story recovers the historic processes, and touches upon the international solidarity 
networks, that enabled sustainability innovations within the coffee value chain.2  This story occurs from 1999 
through 2008, yet the agrarian reforms and collective social relationships that enabled the sustainability 
innovations trace their history to Nicaragua's revolution in 1979.  
 
Nicaragua's popular revolution  
 After more than 45 years of the Somoza family dictatorship and their personal wealth accumulation, 
the Nicaraguan people rose up and toppled them, taking over the capital city of Managua on July 19th, 1979 
(Ramírez 1999). By the late 1970s, the Somoza dynasty had controlled more than 25% of all productive 
assets in the country (Austin, Fox and Kruger 1985). There was frequent state-backed torture, and political 
oppression (e.g. no free elections, effective opposition parties, or a free press). The Frente Sandinista de 
Liberación Nacional, or the Sandinistas, led the collective uprising, which consisted of a broad based 
coalition involving several political parties, students, selected elites, indigenous communities and rural 
families (Saldaña-Portillo 2003). This bottom-up support emerged from organizing efforts conducted 
throughout the 1970s, and a political platform that responded to their aspirations and interests (Gould 1990). 
After initially setting up a multiparty governing council, the Sandinistas consolidated their power and the 
executive branch named Daniel Ortega the President.  
 With broad based popular support from most Nicaraguans in the early 1980s, solidarity from many 
countries, and a little room to maneuver after the US pulled its support for Somoza (and before it started 
using "secret" military bases in Honduras to finance, arm and directly attack targets in Nicaraguan territory), 
the early political leaders began the task of remaking the government. They amended important components 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
2 A transnational solidarity movement is a series of social network connections in which protagonists in two or more 
countries coordinate efforts to achieve a common political purpose (Perla 2008: 138). 
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of the Constitution to expand civil, political and social rights; created a new army oriented toward public 
protection and a new police force, while simultaneously making commitments to free public education, 
conducting a highly effective national literacy campaign, establishing innovative community-based public 
health programs, and implementing agrarian reforms. The early years were characterized by many stories of 
social change and transformation as artists, politicians and individuals sought re-make Nicaraguan society 
(Cardenal 2003; Belli 1984).   
 Government agrarian reforms led by the Sandinistas planted the organizational seeds for Nicaragua's 
agricultural modern smallholder cooperative sector and its connections into Fair Trade networks (Enríquez 
1991).  The government managed a series of land reforms throughout the 1980s, which eventually affected 
up to 50% of the 5.6 million hectares then in production (CIPRES 2006).  The first phases of the land reform 
had broad public support since they primarily consisted of reallocating Somoza's vast assets.  Most—but not 
all—of this land was redistributed from large holdings into state run enterprises and thousands of 
cooperatives (CIERA 1989).  Influence remained with the top-level government agencies from the 1980s into 
the early 21st century. This was due in part to a Sandinista strategy pursued from the mid-1980s. They 
gradually lost connection with the aspirations of a growing number of smallholders and workers.  So they 
simultaneously provided avenues for smallholder collective organizing and agency, while frequently 
reserving the balance of political power for the large landholders and party leaders (Holt-Giminez 2006: 
185).     
 Although the Sandinista government made economic blunders (e.g. skyrocketing inflation and 
contradictory agricultural policies), permitted internal corruption, and was arguably misled by an ideological 
domestic politics that failed to "recognize that autonomous forms of class, ethnic, and regional consciousness 
can aid rather than impede the development of the revolutionary process" (Gould 1990: 67), the reason why 
the government did not fully deliver upon its potential, or win the 1990 election, can be explained primarily 
by the US backed Contra War. The USA's military intervention overwhelmed the Sandinista government's 
capacity to simultaneously re-build a country and fight a Superpower. The US backed insurgency started 
when the ex-members of Somoza's elite and notoriously brutal military guard, La Guardia, fled to Honduras.  
From this territorial base, the US military and CIA provided them with arms, training, and logistical support.  
After initially considering Scandinavian social democratic style economic policy, powerful and ideologically 
motivated leaders in the Sandinista turned increasingly to Cuba, Libya and the former USSR among others 
for support. These alliances only exacerbated the heat within this Cold War conflict, and with a few 
exceptions delivered few benefits to Nicaraguans.  By the mid-1980s, the Contras were able to recruit an 
increasing number of disaffected and hungry Nicaraguans, both voluntarily and forcefully.  In a country with 
population of less than four million at the time, more than 50,000 Nicaraguans were killed in the war, 
affecting everybody living in the country (Kinzer 1991).   
 The Contra War became an ideological project for President Reagan and several members of his 
Administration.  Citing fears about the spread of Communism from Cuba to Nicaragua and then beyond, and 
the Sandinista's increasing tilt towards Russia, Reagan considered the Contras "Freedom Fighters" and 
ensured that they would be armed, financed, and provided direct military support at times in violation of 
Congressional laws and over the objections of most US citizens. The Central American Peace and Solidarity 
Movement catalyzed much of the North American based civil society resistance by organizing thousands of 
international delegations, cultural events, and media campaigns. The San Francisco Bay Area (henceforth, 
"Bay Area") emerged as an important hub for these solidarity-based organizing efforts.   
 After the Sandinista party lost the elections in 1990, government subsidies stopped flowing to 
smallholder cooperatives and moved toward the large private landholders. In the 1980s, coffee cooperatives 
were often run by national government agencies in a top-down fashion, and few producer organizations had 
direct access to importers and roasters, nor were the cooperatives able to re-invest the revenues from their 
coffee sales into their business and community development projects (Chamorro 2005). The Sandinista 
government's agricultural Ministry only began titling land to individual smallholders in the late 1980s.  The 
agrarian reform cooperatives that survived the political changes into the 1990s were generally the ones that 
affiliated with larger cooperative unions and most of them eventually connected into the Fair Trade system.  
The most effective cooperatives that continue to lead a resurgence of the Nicaragua cooperative movement in 
the early 21st century consisted of smallholder coffee growers, many of which are now connected to Fair 
Trade markets and the specialty coffee industry. 
 
The roots of the specialty coffee revolution in California and the US 
 In a related series of events, Northern California became an epicenter for the birth and growth of the 
specialty coffee industry, including pioneer specialty coffee roasters like Peets Coffee in Berkeley, and 
Thanksgiving Coffee in Fort Bragg. This industry was small throughout the 1980s before the rapid expansion 
of Starbucks and Peets Coffee brought it into the mainstream by the late 1990s.  In fact, Starbucks' first 
roastmaster was hired away from Peet's coffee.  The San Francisco Bay Area was an important node for both 
the specialty coffee industry and the Central American Peace and Solidarity Movement (CAPSM).  Many 
international solidarity delegations, led by organizations like Witness for Peace, traveled to Nicaragua, and 
picked coffee in war zones (Burbach 2009).  These experiences changed the perspectives and awakened the 
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political consciousness among thousands of people that later returned to their Western countries to become 
academics, business leaders and politicians. They often returned home with several bags of terrible tasting 
coffee (product quality was not an issue among those interested in politics at the time) and attempted to sell 
solidarity-based coffee to their friends, church congregations, and political allies. Others would go on to build 
businesses and certification agencies (e.g. Paul Rice, CEO of TransFair USA).   
Some people, like Paul Katzeff, would dramatically influence the structure of the coffee industry. 
Originally from New York, Paul Katzeff is a self-described 1960s radical who claims to have once run 
Hunter S. Thompson's campaign for Sheriff in Aspen, Colorado, before moving to Northern California to 
found one of the earlier artisan coffee roasting companies in 1972.  Katzeff's life and work tell the story that 
connects the Central American Peace and Solidarity Movement with sustainability innovations, and Fair 
Trade coffee more than anybody else.  After studying agronomy at Cornell University and later employment 
as a social worker, he returned to New York City to work in his father's grocery store.  He also became active 
in tenant housing organizing efforts.  The combination of a broken heart, Beatnik poets and the ocean were 
enough to inspire Katzeff's continued Westward migration. He eventually moved to Mendocino, California, 
co-founded Thanksgiving Coffee Company (TCC) with Joan Katzeff and spent plenty of time in the Bay 
Area.   
Coffee and revolutionary politics overlapped in unexpected places.  Together with several small-scale 
roasting companies and importers, many of which were based in the Bay Area, Katzeff became a co-founder 
of the Specialty Coffee Association of America (SCAA).  The SCAA would later become the world's largest 
(by number of members) coffee industry association.  Their third annual meeting in February 1985 included a 
symposium entitled "Coffee, Human Rights and Third World Economies" (TCC 1987).  Apparently during 
this symposium an activist filled a nearby water fountain with red dye, dramatically demonstrating the blood 
coffee from El Salvador that roasting companies purchased from the same landed elite that controlled the 
large coffee plantations and also financed the death squads repressing popular resistance.  Katzeff, who was 
an early president of the association, promoted a open dialogue that took issues of human rights and 
environmental sustainability more seriously than most industry associations. Nicaragua's Sandinista 
government sent Daniel Nuñez, the president of the national farmers and ranchers' association and arguably 
the country's most powerful peasant leader in the 1980s, to attend the SCAA. Nuñez extended an open 
invitation to all participants to visit Nicaragua. Although Equal Exchange co-founder Jonathan Rosenthal 
also made many trips to Nicaragua in the 1980s, Kazteff claims to be the one who respond directly Nunez's 
invitation.  Fair Trade coffee in the USA historically connected to coffee farming, smallholder cooperatives, 
and to Nicaragua's Sandinista Revolution.    
Since that first trip in 1984, Katzeff has returned to Nicaragua on over sixty occasions (Katzeff, 
personal communication).  The first coffee related project to emerge from these cross cultural exchange was 
called Coffee for Peace.  The Reagan Administration declared an embargo on all Nicaraguan products in 
May of 1985.  Thanksgiving Coffee Company then partnered with Oxfam Canada/Bridgehead Trading to 
import and roast the Nicaraguan coffee in Canada, and then import it again into the USA as a Canadian 
product.  The coffee was then sold to individuals and groups active in the CAPSM as "Nicaraguan Coffee for 
Peace" (see Figure 3).  Bridgehead trading in Ottawa paid ECAFE (the state-owned Nicaraguan coffee 
company that controlled nearly all exports during the 1980s) and then sent US$ 1.54 for every pound of 
coffee directly to la Union Nacional de Agricultura y Ganederos (UNAG the national farmers and ranchers 
association, which was involved in creating rural producers' cooperatives throughout the 1980s and 1990s). 
The coffee was then sold to Canterbury Coffee in British Colombia and then imported by Thanksgiving 
Coffee as a finished product from Canada.  Once the coffee was packaged and sold an additional US$ 0.15/lb 
(US$ 0.33/kg) of roasted coffee was channeled directly to UNAG. There were several projects like this, 
including the dynamic work of Equal Exchange, a worker-owned cooperative and pioneering fair trade  
company created in Boston in 1986.   
 
The coffee quality revolution in Nicaragua, 1998-2004 
 In 1998, Paul Katzeff returned to Nicaragua. However, this time he was not invited by representatives 
from the Sandinista government, but by the organizers of a shade-grown coffee conference in Managua.  
After his talk, a staffer from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) asked him to 
submit a project.  The core ideas for this project were summarized in a "Proposal to create a pilot project in 
Nicaragua, 1999-2002" (Katzeff 1998). 
 Katzeff's analysis identified the major institution in the part of the value chain controlled by producing 
countries as the dry beneficio. Farmers harvest de-pulp and wash this coffee before bringing them to these 
centralized processing plants where it is dried, sorted and packed in 152 lb (69 kg) burlap sacks for export.  
The dry beneficios are largely in the hands of the agro-industrialists who often buy the small-scale farmer's 
coffee. The value chain structure leaves these farmers without access to their own coffee as a finished 
product—and thus the campesino has never tasted the fruits of his or her labor. So small-scale farmers sold 
an unknown product, to an unknown market, whose quality was graded according unknown standards, and 
received an unpredictable final price.  Most farmers had no idea of the final retail prices paid for the coffee 
they grew.  The goal of the project was break these blinders by building ten coffee tasting laboratories with 
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small-scale farmer cooperatives. Katzeff's vision was that building labs with small-scale producer 
cooperatives would enable farmers to taste their own coffee as a finished product, improve coffee quality, 
invite premium-paying specialty coffee buyer into their spaces, and that the higher prices would encourage 
sustainable farm management and "eliminate" poverty (Katzeff 1998). Several of these cooperatives had 
already used Fair Trade as an important strategy to unite their cooperatives, and moved up in the value chain 
by purchasing their own agro-industrial facilities to prepare coffee for export. The importance of coffee 




Figure 3: Coffee for Peace: a strategy to break the Reagan administration's embargo against 
Nicaragua. Source:  Thanksgiving Coffee Company. 
 
 After successfully avoiding elite project capture, the next step was to find "authentic" smallholder 
cooperatives interested in building coffee tasting labs. This was much easier said than done. At the time, 
Nicaragua still had many cooperatives that actually consisted of larger landholders and a national association 
of exporters and landholders that had enjoyed decades of support intended for smallholders.  In short, the 
Nicaraguan coffee industry was still squarely in the hands of the elite.  The coffee labs project became high 
profile, with many organizations seeking entry.  Nicaragua's three most important Fair Trade cooperative 
unions, PRODECOOP, SOPPEXCCA and CECOCAFEN were not involved at that time, and quite 
suspicious due to the USAID funding and the Nicaraguan field coordinator.  But Nick Hoskyns, a Sandinista 
Revolution inspired Brit that moved to Nicaragua just out of college in 1989, knew the presidents and general 
managers of these cooperatives from his previous Fair Trade and solidarity work.   
 The project started with the cooperative presidents and general managers sharing a five-day vision trip 
to experience cupping labs in the US at Bay Area coffee importers, such as Holland Coffee and Royal 
Coffee, and roasters including Thanksgiving Coffee Company in Fort Bragg California.  Most had never seen 
their coffee as a final product on the supermarket shelves, much less been inside the coffee cupping 
laboratories to see the people who make "the market" actually evaluate their coffee.  In addition to gaining an 
insider's knowledge of the other end of this commodity chain, five days driving around California in a van 
provided a powerful trust-building and communications experience among the leaders from these 
cooperatives, several of whom had not previously worked together.  The leaders returned to Nicaragua with 
the goal of designing smallholder cooperative-based coffee cupping labs.  
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 Visits to the cupping labs managed by some of the coffee industry's powerful buyers and importers 
further convinced the Nicaraguans that coffee slurping and mysterious discussion about detecting chocolate, 
citrus, blueberries, and apricots in their coffee mattered, and was potentially a core strategic investment.  The 
art and science of coffee tasting, or cupping, has long been an esoteric practice conducted behind closed 
doors in small corporate "laboratories".  Commercial roasters, importers and roasters are more interested in 
identifying and eliminating "defective" coffee beans (e.g. that have been over fermented, or are too old, or 
molded during storage), than finding those unique flavors in the cup. These defects are relatively easily 
identified either physically by the shape, size and color of the bean or by sour flavors and bad taste.  
However, specialty roasters were seeking specific flavor profiles that they could use in the proprietary blends 
that define their branded coffees.  Although there was some basic defect elimination-based quality control 
plans in place in Nicaragua, no smallholder cooperatives had a cupping lab or the professional staff to taste 
the coffee and communicate with international buyers. Without this, there was little possibility of 
experimentation to improve quality, and no direct communication with the specialty roasters interested in 
differentiating Nicaraguan coffee on the international commodities market.  Katzeff introduced a score sheet 
that cuppers could use to evaluate each coffee, suggesting that specialty coffees have scores of 80 and above 
on a scale of 1 to 100 (Figure 4).  The sheet was later modified and adopted for general use by all SCAA 
members.  This sheet is complemented by the SCAA's official coffee flavor wheel, including more than 60 
distinct flavors, ranging from sour, astringent and scorched to leather-like and rounded. 
 Coffee tasting is a skill that is learned. The cooperatives invested in training a new cadre of young 
people to staff these labs and also work with farmers to improve their coffee quality. The criteria for selecting 
these cuppers included youthful enthusiasm, education beyond 6th grade and, if possible, to be a child of one 
of the cooperative's coffee farmers. As of 2008, there were at least 20 new jobs created for young cooperative 
youth to continue their involvement in this coffee quality improvement project. These young cuppers proved 
to be effective coffee tasters and several have won international acclaim.   
 People working in different places established coffee cupping labs, developed quality control and 
assurance systems within the cooperative controlled segments of the value chain and scaled up in at least 
three ways.  First — and most importantly—the participating cooperatives used the project as a platform to 
develop their own agenda. During our meetings with them from 2002 to 2004, PRODECOOP,  
CECOCAFEN, SOPPEXCCA and five other cooperatives united to create La Asociación de Cooperativas de 
Pequeños Productores de Café de Nicaragua, (The Nicaraguan Association of Smallholder Coffee 
Cooperatives) or CAFENICA. This association became the largest association of coffee farmers in Nicaragua 
representing more than 9,000 small-scale farmers, 80% of the Fair Trade coffee and more than 80% of the 
organic producers in the country. CAFENICA's national coverage (Figure 5) and administrative capacity 
enabled them to compete with the Associacion de Cafés Especiales, which was Nicaragua's dominant coffee 
association that primarily represents the interests of the landed elite and private exporters.  
These efforts to scale up for political empowerment were matched with an economic approach that 
focused on a marketing strategy to expand their sales of specialty and certified "sustainable" coffee.  Katzeff 
contributed to this goal by inviting the coffee importer from a larger-scale transnational trader on a tour, 
together with six owners/buyers from geographically separated regional specialty roasting companies across 
the United States. For ten days they toured the coffee cooperatives, cupped coffee in the labs, and built 
relationships. The coffee samples tasted, landscapes experienced, and personal relationships developed 
during this trip would later yield millions of dollars in annual coffee sales and more direct relationships with 
Nicaragua's cooperative sector.   
 
What were the outcomes?  
 An agrarian power shift begins: The cooperatives were able to use their cupping labs, specialty coffee 
industry allies, and their intense bottom-up organizing effort, to create La Asociación de Cooperativas de 
Pequeños Productores de Café de Nicaragua (CAFENICA), and by 2009, to gain control of about 30% of 
Nicaragua's coffee exporters. This was a dramatic structural change after more than 150 years in which 
foreign and local elites had dominated the domestic coffee industry. CAFENICA is the first autonomous 
smallholder coffee cooperative association in Nicaragua and among the strongest in Latin America. The 
Association's presence, together with support from the progressive specialty coffee roasters, Fair Trade 
certification, and a strong network of international NGOs supporting them, has effectively challenged the 
centuries-old dominance of the landed coffee elite as smallholder organizations compete successfully for 
rural development money and access to coffee buyers.  
 The members of CAFENICA have used their deeper knowledge about the qualities of their coffee as 
well as this political influence to ensure transparent conduct during the 2004 Nicaraguan Cup of Excellence 
competition (Table 1).  The Cup of Excellence project team coordinates with specialty coffee roasters and 
importers from the US, Europe and Japan as it seeks to identify and promote the top quality coffees in 
different countries. These competitions are coordinated by a US based company, and occur in coffee 
producing countries. Farmers and exporters send their samples to a centralized warehouse, which is usually 
administered by an international NGO and/or domestic coffee association.  The samples are coded so that the 
coffee tasters judge anonymous samples in a blind review process in the cupping labs. The number of coffee 
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samples submitted to the competition in Nicaragua often exceeds three hundred (Tea and Coffee 2004).  The 
top scores are announced and then sold at an international auction.  Some lots of coffee earn prices that are 
four to ten times above the conventional commodity prices and gain an international reputation that could 
earn premiums for years (Wilson et al. 2012).  In 2004, the international jury of coffee roasters awarded the 
coffee samples that originated on farms from CAFENICA-affiliated cooperatives nine of the top 11 prizes 
and 14 of the top 29 samples identified as finalists (see Table 1).  PRODECOOP-affiliated cooperatives and 
farmers won four of the top five places.  This victory, and the creation of CAFENICA also contributed to the 








Figure 4:  Early SCAA cupping evaluation form. Source:  Adapted from Katzeff, 2001b.   
   
Many of CAFENICA's Fair Trade allies still remember when the awards were announced in the 
exclusive Social Club in Matagalpa in 2004. The wealthy large estate owners, exporters, and eager NGO's 
like Techno Serve were there with other members of Nicaragua's Association de Café Especiales, fully 
expecting to walk away with most awards. The small-scale producers affiliated with the cooperatives were 
huddled together in back of the room, letting their paid general managers negotiate the clear class-based 
divisions.  Yet by the end of the evening, they walked away with the top awards. Merling Preza, 
PRODECOOP's manager, also remembers this as one of the best moments in Nicaraguan cooperative history, 
"this is the time when we showed them that yes we can."  Later in the press conference, she reminded all that 
producing quality coffee, just like working to improve people's quality of life, is the Responsibilidad de 
Todos (Everyone's Responsibility), she also re-stated the quality exchange proposal that Nicaragua 
smallholders offered industry and coffee consumers, stating that "This is the essence of a quality exchange—
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Figure 5: Map of small-scale coffee marketing cooperatives in Nicaragua affiliated with 
Cafenica. Source:  Cafenica, 2008; Prepared by Antonia Gunner, Department of Environmental 




The capacity of the cooperatives to organize smallholders and to defend their land titles has delivered 
benefits for their professional managers.  Merling Preza is now on the board of directors for several of the 
most powerful Fair Trade movement oriented organizations, and CECOCAFEN's past president and manager 
during the project, Pedro Haslam, was elected to the Nicaragua's National Assembly in 2006, and as of 2012, 
he is the minister of the newly created Ministry of Family, Community, Cooperative and Associative 
Economies (Ministerio de Economía Familiar, Comunitaria, Cooperativa y Asociativa). The cooperative 
unions have also increased their productive capacity, professional staff, and social support programs.  This 
empowerment process was uneven, even within the CAFENICA, and persistent tensions remain among the 
smaller and larger cooperatives within CAFENICA (Bacon 2006).  Although the social and environmental 
qualities of coffee have often supported smallholder cooperatives, the costs of meeting the standards that 
focus on the physical and flavour-based attributes of the bean are very high and often lower the net revenues 
for farmers and cooperatives (Renard 2005; CLAC 2006). This project also contributed to several dynamic 
change processes within the specialty coffee industry. And yet, the outcomes among the smallholders were 
mixed.  
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Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total 
Number coffee samples 
identified as finalists from 
an annual pool of 250-400 
23 37  29 35 124 
Number of samples from 
farms affiliated with 
smallholder Fair Trade 
cooperatives  
8 11 14 18 51 
Percentage finalists from 
smallholder co-ops 34.78% 29.73% 48.28% 51.43% 41.13% 
 
Table 1:  Nicaraguan Cup of Excellence scores, 2002-2005.   Source:  Twin 2005.  
 
Changing smallholder livelihoods:  Participatory research teams have conducted at least five studies 
involving more than 800 farmers in side-by-side comparisons to evaluate the impacts of participation in 
cooperatives and sales to Fair Trade markets in Northern Nicaragua (Bacon et al. 2008b; Bacon 2005a; 
Mendez et al. 2010; Arnould and Plastina 2005). Regardless of affiliation, the coffee revenue generated 
within most households in the country is insufficient to grant US$1/day for the average of six people that live 
in a smallholder household (Bacon et al. 2008b). But the results from several past surveys reveal a more 
nuanced story, when farm households linked to Fair Trade cooperatives that have built these cupping labs are 
compared to similar households that are not affiliated to these cooperatives.  
• Households linked to these cooperatives were more likely to have their school age children 
currently attending class, than those selling to conventional markets.  
• Households connected to Fair Trade coops reported farm gate coffee prices that were 63% higher 
than those reported by non-affiliated households in 2004.   
• Farmers affiliated with Fair Trade cooperatives claimed access to more NGO-based social support 
networks than farmers that were not connected to these cooperatives (Bacon et al.  2008b).   
Nonetheless, the evidence also shows that most small-scale farmers continue to navigate seasonal hunger, 
increased debt and persistent livelihood insecurities, suggesting that access to Fair Trade and organic coffee 
markets alone are insufficient to meet several of their important basic need goals.  
 
7. Resonance and revolutions: knowledge, power and praxis  
Resonances  
 This article resonates with others in this special section of the Journal of Political Ecology.  Several of 
the same hybrids that enabled these sustainability innovations also surfaced in Ariane de Bremond's 
recounting of resurgent forests and rural communities in post-war El Salvador (de Bremond 2013).  
Moreover, like Phadke's article, I identify the new costs and potential shortcomings that can be associated 
with what is widely viewed as a positive alternative to business as usual (Fair Trade in this case and large 
dams in her case) (Phadke 2013).  De Bremond and I both identify civil society's resistance to aspects of the 
Green Revolution, and in the coffee sector this is evident in the rise of social and environmental certification 
programs and the way that millions of smallholders have maintained their shade trees, older coffee plant 
varieties, and avoided becoming dependent on agrochemicals. This combination of older higher quality 
varieties and ecological conservation was part of the rapidly expanding specialty coffee market, titled "the 
Latte Revolution" by one author (Ponte 2002).  Yet this industry-centered revolution is qualitatively different 
with regard to the stakes, popular struggle, level of risk, suffering, solidarity and occasional personal 
transformation that accompanied the 1979 Revolution in Nicaragua.    
Although quality standards and the uneven power dynamics within tropical value chains continue to 
favor Northern retailers, roasters and traders, Nicaragua's coffee quality improvement project shows that an 
astute political ecology analysis, in fact a well-timed project financed by the United States Agency for 
International Development that united a progressive business leader with representative smallholder leaders, 
can find spaces for empowerment. The fragmentation and neoliberalization of the global coffee industry 
evidenced by the collapse of International Coffee Agreements facilitated still more revenue capture in 
Western countries (Talbot 2004). So far, higher quality standards have translated into more work, 
investments, and only slightly higher prices to tropical producers and smallholders. Paradoxically, this 
market fragmentation and the emergence of specialty coffee also contributed to the dramatic growth in Fair 
Trade sales in the USA.  The partnership based model was promoted through Nicaragua's coffee cupping lab 
project, and through several versions of Fair Trade supported smallholder cooperative efforts to gain direct 
access to roasters and a fairer deal in increasingly uneven global markets. Cooperative leaders used these 
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partnerships to secure several goals, such as rural smallholders land access, originally achieved through the 
Revolution that occurred when a popular uprising toppled the Somoza dictatorship and the Sandinista 
government promoted a series of agrarian reforms.   
 
Emergent tensions: classic revolutions, Polanyian double movements, and the future of sustainable hybrids 
 In this article, I considered the connection between a Polanyian double movement to socially regulate 
the excesses of the free trade commodities market through the creation of the Fair Trade system, and the 
different ways this system connects to the politics of coffee production.  I have explored the possibility that 
more direct producer-cooperative-roaster relations could be a starting point for a series of sustainability 
innovations and a renewed partnership with increased accountability and better results for Southern 
communities and landscapes (Rajan and Duncan 2013). I did this without forgetting the critical wing of 
political ecology which reminds us that a deeper agricultural and food-based imperialism is clearly the 
dominant trend in this recent post 1989 phase of liberalization and globalization and a recognition that 
Southern states will need to play a stronger role in efforts to negotiate a fairer deal for their citizens (Clapp 
and Fuchs 2009).  Specifically, I addressed the transnational solidarity networks, hybrids, and state 
interventions that drove three interconnected sustainability innovations. 
 The 1979 Revolution and subsequent Sandinista government built agrarian social capital, "thickened a 
rural civil society", and cultivated the international solidarity efforts that influenced many small-scale coffee 
roasters, coffee drinkers and Western citizens in the process (Fox 1996; Perla 2008). Katzeff's political 
commitments combined intimate knowledge of coffee biochemical and taste characteristics gained from 
decades as a roaster, with an expanding business network. This proved an important contribution that was 
more than matched by the sophistication of smallholder cooperatives in Nicaragua.  Beyond an elitist mark of 
distinction (Bourdieu 1984), the power of taste evaluation was quickly learned among rural cooperatives, 
opening up immediate business opportunities and a plethora of possibilities ranging from increased farmer 
participation in the art of coffee production to new forms of rural communication and experimentation (e.g. 
connecting agroecological farm management to flavors in the cup). 
 The cupping project prioritized the social ties of solidarity and craftsmanship, inserting the business 
development strategies that were oriented to the social economy into these relationships.  In this way, it 
contributed to a relatively small Polanyian double movement in Nicaragua along the US coffee value chain.  
While important, the scale of this action is not commensurate with society-wide Polanyian double 
movements (Rajan and Duncan 2013). Rather than dismissing the case as insignificant, and highlighting the 
inability to translate these power shifts into substantial livelihood improvements among the thousands of 
farmers connected to these smallholder cooperatives, I propose we harvest the lessons learned from this 
experience and imagine the contents of a continuing praxis.  
 The sustainability innovations that emerged from this project were the construction of cupping labs 
within smallholder cooperatives, and the creation of a national association of smallholder cooperatives 
promoting artisan producers, sustainability and a vision of integrated quality (CAFENICA).  As Figure 2 
shows, the labs and cooperatives introduced a new dimension of performance into coffee value chains.  
Smallholders used this new generation of cooperatives and Fair Trade, and later the cupping labs, to compete 
for direct market access. Once in the market, they could more effectively peruse their community 
development goals. The social history of these innovations shows that they are much more than the market 
niche activities that some claim they are today. 
 The first hybrid in this story is the iterative nature-society relationships implicit in farming practice.  If 
it were not for the farmers' labor, together with nature's ecological work, there would be no red coffee 
cherries to harvest and transform into that dark brew. Without the beans, there are no rural coffee 
cooperatives, Fair Trade certified marketplace, or coffee industry.  No industry, no Starbucks, and no stories 
carried by these beans to distant places, and no energy to finish this article. 
 The second is a state-civil society hybrid that started in 1979 with the popular Revolution that toppled 
the Somoza dictatorship, continued in many programs promoted by the Sandinista government (though 
certainly not in all places given the growing personal economic interests, close-minded communist approach, 
and autocratic tendencies among a handful of individuals and ideologues within The Party).  In the 1980s, the 
state supported what would later become more autonomous social movements and producer organizations (in 
the 1990s after the Sandinistas lost the election). Well beyond the contribution to this innovation, I argue that, 
like the "Revolutions of 1968", and Nicaragua's Revolution of 1979, "bequeathed …a rethinking of the 
politics of the possible, and ….unleashed a long march through the institutions which have left an indelible 
mark on the politics of the contemporary era." (Watts 2001: 157).  To borrow a term from David Harvey, 
they were "spaces of hope", some of which are still found today (Harvey 2000). The rethinking and the 
relationships inspired by this moment clearly enabled the three sustainability innovations (cooperatives, Fair 
Trade and cupping labs) discussed in this article.   
 There is a third business civil society hybrid. It is currently the most controversial, also enabled these 
sustainable innovations. The SCAA finds few parallels among industry associations today. It was able to mix 
civil society based sustainability politics in the USA with providing a platform for launching the Fair Trade 
certified coffee in the late 1990s and early 21st century. Along the way, it organized a symposium on human 
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rights and third world economies in 1985. SCAA is part of Fair Trade itself, which began as a civil society 
based alternative trade partnership in the 1940s and 1950s. Yet, since a certification system was introduced in 
1988 across many large corporations, Fair Trade labeling has increasingly become another niche marketing 
strategy (Bacon, et al., 2008).  The increasing power of certification agencies and their pursuit of aggressive 
market-based growth, often at the expense of demands for social justice, has undermined the positions of 
many smallholder leaders and started to dilute the alternative trade and civil society and movement 
dimensions of the Fair Trade hybrid (Jaffee 2007; Bacon et al.  2008). This suggests a need to further explore 
the theoretical and empirical links between Polanyian double movements and more classically defined 
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Nicaraguan smallholder cooperative leaders working in partnership with a California-based small-scale 
roasting company pioneered an alternative approach to confronting the post-1999 coffee crisis.  They built 
coffee tasting laboratories and integrated grassroots organizing efforts to create a national smallholder 
cooperative association that dramatically improved the quality, consistency, and prices from of the coffee 
they exported.  Cooperative leaders used this development project to gain a more significant share of political 
economic power in a domestic coffee industry historically dominated by colonial powers, and corporate and 
domestic elites.  This alli.ance between the artisanal small-scale roasting companies and cooperative leaders 
also proved that smallholders selling into fair trade markets could consistently produce and export high 
quality coffee. This case study unfolds into Nicaragua's northern mountains, northern California's coastal 
cities and the commodity trade and solidarity networks that connect them.  Beyond following the coffee bean 
from mountainside farmers, through artisan specialty coffee roasters, and into the hands of Bay Area coffee 
drinkers, the article recovers the history of political and technological revolutions and the transnational 
solidarity networks that contributed to sustainability innovations within the coffee value chain.  Although the 
tangible benefits of fair trade coffee to farmers and landscapes have not lived up to the lofty proclamations of 
its advocates, farmers generally receive higher prices for their coffee and are frequently more secure in their 
land titles.  This political ecology of coffee and solidarity suggests theoretical questions about the role of 
classic revolutions, and Polanyian double movements in the efforts to practice the alternative values and 
principles that motivate many of today's sustainability innovations. 
Key words: Nicaragua, participatory action research, coffee cooperatives, sustainability, innovations. 
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Résumé 
Les dirigeants des coopératives de café au Nicaragua, a travaillé en partenariat avec une entreprise de 
torréfaction en Californie. Ensemble, ils ont lancé une autre approche pour faire face à la crise post-1999 de 
café. Ils ont construit des laboratoires de dégustation de café et de coopération intégrée à la base. Ils ont créé 
une association paysanne coopérative qui a considérablement amélioré la qualité, la cohérence et les prix du 
café qu'ils exportés. Les dirigeants des coopératives utilise ce projet de développement d'acquérir une part 
importante du pouvoir politico-économique dans un secteur du café historiquement dominé par les 
puissances coloniales, les entreprises, et les élites nationales. Cette alliance entre les artisans des petits 
entreprises de torréfaction et de dirigeants de coopératives ont également prouvé que les petits exploitants 
vendent leurs produits sur les marchés du commerce équitable pourrait toujours produire et exporter du café 
de haute qualité. Cette étude de cas se déroule dans les montagnes du nord du Nicaragua, les villes côtières 
du nord de la Californie et les réseaux commerciaux des produits de base et de la solidarité qui les relient. Il 
suit le grain de café auprès des agriculteurs à flanc de montagne, à travers les torréfacteurs de café de 
spécialité, et dans les mains de buveurs de café en Californie. Il récupère l'histoire des révolutions politiques 
et technologiques et les réseaux de solidarité transnationaux qui ont contribué à des innovations de 
développement durable au sein de la chaîne de valeur du café. Bien que les avantages tangibles de café issu 
du commerce équitable pour les agriculteurs et les paysages ne sont pas à la hauteur des aspirations élevées 
de ses partisans, les agriculteurs reçoivent des prix plus élevés pour leur café et sont souvent plus en sécurité 
dans leurs titres fonciers. Cette écologie politique du café et de la solidarité suggère des questions théoriques 
sur le rôle des révolutions classiques, et 'mouvements doubles' Polanyienne dans les efforts pour pratiquer les 
valeurs alternatives et des principes qui motivent un grand nombre d'innovations de développement durable 
d'aujourd'hui. 






Los líderes de cooperativas de pequeños propietarios nicaragüenses, trabajando conjuntamente con una 
pequeña compañía de torrefacción basada en California, fueron los primeros en aplicar una nueva forma de 
enfrentarse a la crisis del café posterior a 1999: construyeron laboratorios de cata de café e integraron los 
esfuerzos organizativos de comunidades de base para crear una asociación cooperativa nacional de pequeños 
propietarios que mejoró dramáticamente la calidad, la consistencia y los precios del café que exportaron. Los 
líderes de las cooperativas pusieron en marcha este proyecto para ganar una porción más significativa de 
poder político-económico en una industria cafetera históricamente dominada por los poderes coloniales, 
grandes empresas multinacionales y élites nacionales. Esta alianza entre pequeñas compañías artesanales de 
torrefacción y líderes de cooperativas también demostró que pequeños propietarios que venden en mercados 
de comercio justo pueden producir y exportar de manera consistente café de alta calidad. Este estudio de caso 
se desarrolla en las montañas del norte de Nicaragua, en ciudades costeras del norte de California y en las 
redes de comercio de mercancía y de solidaridad que las conectan. Más allá de seguir el grano de café desde 
los granjeros en las montañas, pasando por los artesanos especializados en la torrefacción, hasta llegar a los 
consumidores de café de Bay Area, el artículo recupera la historia de las revoluciones, tanto la política como 
la tecnológica, y las redes de solidaridad internacional que contribuyeron a las innovaciones en la 
sostenibilidad dentro de la cadena de valor del café. Esta política ecológica del café y la solidaridad provoca 
cuestionamientos teóricos sobre el papel de las revoluciones clásicas, dobles movimientos polanyanos en un 
esfuerzo por llevar a la práctica los valores alternativos y los principios que motivan numerosas innovaciones 
de sostenibilidad actuales. 
Palabras clave: Nicaragua, la investigación-acción participativa, cooperativas de café, la sostenibilidad, la 
innovación. 
